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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the 
existence of backwardation on the futures markets, based on Routh-
akker's work dealing with asymmetry of arbitrage on such markets. 
The central assumption of the paper is that cash and futures prices 
tend to be more highly correlated at low than at high cash prices. 
This assumption reflects the asymmetry in arbitrage opportunities 
in futures markets; in particular, at the maturity date of a 
futures contract, the futures price cannot exceed the cash price 
of any grade-location combination deliverable under the futures 
contract. The main result of the paper is a proposition that asserts 
that with identical long and short hedgers, with the same wheat 
commitments on both sides of the market, and with utility functions 
exhibiting constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, if the 
probability density function over cash and futures prices is 
sufficiently concentrated at low cash prices, then the resulting 
market equilibrium will exhibit backwardation, that is, the current 
future price is a downward biased estimator of the future futures 
price as well as being a downward biased estimator of the future 
cash price. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central role played by contingent claims markets in the 
optimal allocation of resources under uncertainty is a dominant theme 
in the theoretical literature of modern welfare economics. In 
contrast, the operational characteristics of their real-world 
counterparts, futures markets, are less well-understood. One of the 
intriguing and controversial issues concerning futures markets is that 
of the existence of back:wardation in the pattern of futures prices. 
While ultimately, the presence or absence of backwardation is an 
empirical matter, the occurrence of back:wardation as a theoretical 
matter remains to be completely developed. This paper attempts to 
clarify the theory of back:wardation as applied to a commodity such as 
wheat. We begin by briefly reviewing the back:wardation literature and 
the way in which the term backwardation itself has evolved over time. 
The notion of "normal back:wardation" 1 first appears in a
letter written by Keynes (1923) but his best known comment appears in 
the Treatise on Money (1930). 
2 
If the supply and demand are balanced, the spot price must exceed 
the forward price by the amount which the producer (of a 
commodity) is ready to sacrifice in order to hedge himself i. e. , 
to avoid the risk of price fluctuations during the production 
period. Thus in normal conditions, the spot price exceeds the 
forward price, i. e. , there is back:wardation (vol. II, p. 143). 
Keynes offered no theoretical explanation for the premise that only 
producers hedge, as opposed to both producers and purchasers. In 
Value and Capital, Hicks provides such an explanation, relying on 
substitution possibilities available to purchasers but not to 
producers. 
• • •  technical conditions give the entrepreneuer a much freer 
hand about the acquisition of inputs (which are largely needed to 
start new processes) than about the completion of outputs • • • •
Thus, while there is likely to be some desire to hedge planned 
purchases, it tends to be less insistent than the desire to hedge 
planned sales (p. 137). 
According to the Keynes-Hicks formulation, producers dominate hedging 
as short hedgers (long in the spot market, short in the futures 
market) and pay the amount of the back:wardation (spot price greater 
than forward price) to avoid price risks. 
The next important development in backwardation involves the 
Kaldor-Dow exchange. Kaldor (1939), accepting the Keynes-Hicks 
formulation, assumes all hedgers are short hedgers and derives 
backwardation as an equilibrium condition on the futures market. 
Commenting on Kaldor's work, Dow (1940) emphasizes that both long and 
short hedgers are present in commodity markets but that short hedgers 
should dominate. Dow regards backwardation as the normal state of 
affairs, primarily because existing stocks must be held by someone. 
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Hence, they pose inevitable risks that are available to be hedged. In 
contrast, long hedging arises only when purchasers of a good for 
future delivery decide to engage in such commitments prior to the 
delivery date. In his rejoinder, Kaldor (1940) admits that long 
hedging could dominate. 
in cases where the technical uncertainties associated with 
production are much greater in the stages of production prior to 
the stage where the futures market is situated than in subsequent 
stages (p. 197). 
The idea here is that hedges engaged in by an early stage p._roducer to 
avoid price risks can expose the producer to quantity risks due to 
uncertainties concerning production. Hence, such technical 
uncertainties would tend to discourage short hedging. The notion of 
quantity risk also is emphasized by Hirshleifer (1975). 
We should also note that the Kaldor-Dow exchange introduces a 
concept of back:wardation differing from the Keynes-Hicks notion in 
important respects. For Kaldor, back:wardation means that the futures 
price lies below the expected spot price as of the maturity date of 
the futures contract. In another matter of central importance to the 
back:wardation debate, Dow draws a clear distinction between futures 
and forward contracts. 
Houthakker (195 9) introduces another notion of backwardation, 
namely, back:wardation exists when the futures price is a downward 
biased estimator of its price at maturity of the futures contract, as 
well as being a downward biased estimator of the spot price at that 
maturity date. Thus if backwardation exists in a market, on average 
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the futures price should rise over time. In a later paper, Houthakker 
(1968) rejects Hicks' notion of differential substitution 
possibilities between producers and purchasers as the argument for 
backwardation. Houthakker's alternative explanation rests on the 
asymmetry of arbitrage situations confronting short and long hedgers. 
Short hedgers _have a limited risk because the futures price cannot 
exceed the spot price by more than carrying charges, but long hedgers 
have no such protection. 
As a result of this asymmetry (in arbitraging), short hedgers 
have a limited risk, while long hedgers have an unlimited risk, 
of adverse changes in the basis (p. 196). 
The limited risk enjoyed by short hedgers encourages such hedging 
relative to long hedging. Houthakker also notes that short hedging 
increases as the basis (the difference between the futures and the 
spot prices) increases, and as inventories rise, since large 
inventories are associated with large values of the correlation 
coefficient between spot and futures prices. Thus short hedging tends 
to peak several months after harvest, during the period of low cash 
prices (since large inventories occur at low cash prices as a result 
of burgeoning supply), and reaches a trough around harvest time. 
hedging is not so seasonal.2
We believe the most convincing argument for backwardation 
rests on Houthakker's claim that asymmetric arbitrage leads to an 
Long 
imbalance of hedging, with short hedgers dominating long hedgers. 3 The
resulting market equilibrium, (p�, N) in Figure l, is one in which the
current futures price, p�, is depressed below its expected market
value at time of maturity, E(p:). where curve D is the sum of demand
for futures contracts by speculators and long hedgers while curve SS
represents the supply of futures contracts by short hedgers. 
We attempt to spell out in some detail certain conditions 
under which asymmetric arbitrage leads to backwardation. We do this 
in a simplified two-period model of short and long hedging. 
Admittedly, some of the richness of the Houthakkor approach is lost. 
However, by constructing a formal model of the hedging process, it is 
possible to identify the critical importance of Houthakker's 
assumption that cash and futures prices tend to be more highly 
correlated at low than at high cash prices. 
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We show that under this assumption with short and long hedgers 
having the same commodity commitments and identical utility functions 
characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, the 
resulting market equilibrium exhibits backwardatio�. In contrast, 
when perfect hedges are possible, backwardation does not occur. 
SPOT, FORWARD, AND FUTURES MARKETS 
Hedging and speculation occur within the structure of existing 
commodity markets. Spot (immediate delivery) and forward delivery 
markets for a commodity like wheat exist at every facility capable of 
storage.4 In principle, these "cash markets" could exist at every
farm producing wheat as well. In contrast, the futures market is one 
central market, as illustrated by the market for Chicago wheat 
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6 
futures. The crucial difference between a futures contract and cash 
contracts is that the futures contract provides flexibility with 
respect to delivery terms to the seller of the contract. The seller 
has the choice of the date during the delivery month to make delivery, 
he has the choice of the grade to deliver (subject to contractual 
premiums or penalties for nonstandard grades), and he has the choice 
of the delivery location, from among a list of locations specified in 
the contract. This flexibility of delivery terms is an essential 
ingredient in avoiding problems of thinness or cornering of markets, 
but it also creates problems of uncertainty as to delivery terms for 
the buyer of a futures contract. For this reason, delivery rarely 
takes place under futures contracts; instead, cash or forward 
contracts are typically used when actual transfer of a commodity is 
contemplated. 
In a world of competitive markets operating under perfect 
certainty, the time paths of spot, forward, and futures prices would 
be simple to describe. In the inter-harvest period, the spot price of 
wheat must rise each month by the cost of storage (including interest, 
insurance, and warehousing costs), with the price of wheat falling 
when the new harvest comes in, assuming no carryover. At any point in 
time, the quoted forward and futures prices would be simply the 
corresponding spot prices that would prevail at the dates in the 
future when these forward or futures contracts would mature. (See 
Samuelson (1957)). 
When uncertainty is introduced into the picture, things are 
not at all so straightforward. However, certain basic arbitrage 
relationships among markets can be identified. As a matter of 
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notation, let L denote the set of locations where markets exist and/or 
where delivery of wheat can take place, and let L* CL  denote those 
locations specified for delivery under the futures contract. Let I 
denote the set of grades of wheat, and let I* C I denote those grades 
deliverable at no penalty or premium under the futures contract.5 Let
p�.t denote the cash price of wheat of grade i at time t, for delivery1J 
at location j. Let p!t denote the price at time t of a futures
contract that matures at time s. To keep things manageable, we ignore 
the flexibility as to delivery date in the futures contract. Let rjkt
denote the cost of shipping a bushel of wheat between locations j and 
k, at time t; and let wj(uv)t denote the public warehousing charge
(including interest and insurance) at location j, for storing a bushel 
of wheat between times u and v, the charge being quoted at time t. 
Then we can identify the following arbitrage relations: 
cash to cash: (p�jt - p�ktl � rjkt; (1) 
cash prices for the same grade i at any two locations j and k at time 
t cannot differ by more than the transportation cost between the two 
locations. 
futures to futures: f Pst p
f
t < w.( )t for j & L*, s > u;u - J us 
the price at time t of a futures contract maturing at time s cannot 
(2) 
exceed the price at time t of a futures contract maturing at time u by 
8 
more than the cost at time t of warehousing a unit of the commodity 
between times u and s, at a location specified for delivery under the 
futures contract. 
futures to cash: f Pst 
c p . . < w f . lJt- j(ts)t or J & L*, (3) 
s > t and i e I*; the price at time t of a futures contract maturing 
at time s cannot exceed the cash price at time t, of a grade i and a 
location j eligible for delivery under the futures contract, by more 
than the co.st at time t of warehousing a unit of the commodity between 
times t and s at location j. 
futures to cash: f ptt 
. c f . I* . L* min p .  "t or 1 e , J e ; . . lJ 1, J 
the price at time t of a futures contract maturing at time t is the 
minimum of the cash prices at time t taken over the grades and 
locations eligible for delivery under the futures contract. 
A few comments are in order concerning arbitrage relations 
(4) 
(1)-(4). Relation (1) permits a considerable amount of leeway in the 
spatial structure of prices. Arbitrage reduces but does not eliminate 
the added uncertainties facing producers, consumers, and merchants 
located at points that are not delivery points under the futures 
contract. The specialized knowledge possessed by country elevator 
operators as to how the local cash prices might be expected to vary 
relative to the cash prices at a terminal elevator delivery location 
might explain their readiness to "speculate on the basis." 
Relations (2) and (3) are intertemporal arbitrage relations
9 
·that are asymmetric, that is, they operate in one direction only.
These relations specify a maximum premium of a distant futures price
over a near futures or a cash price, but no corresponding arbitrage
operation is available to determine a maximum discount for the distant
futures price relative to the cash price or the price of a near
futures. Thus, in principle, the cash price at t can exceed the price
at t of a futures maturing at s (s 2 t) by any amount. Extreme cases
of discounts of futures under cash prices arise in the case of
squeezes or corners.
Relation (4) reflects the incentives incorporated into a 
futures contract. Since the seller of a futures contract is free to 
choose the grade and location of delivery (from among the sets I* and 
L*), the terminal value of the futures contract is equal to the market 
value of the least cost grade-location combination eligible for 
delivery under the futures contract. It is clear from relation (4) 
that the case of a "perfect hedge," where the cash and futures prices 
always are equal at the maturity of the futures contract, is the 
special case in which there is just one grade and one location 
eligible for delivery under the futures contract. ·To put it another 
way, the case of a "perfect hedge" arises when the futures contract is 
in fact simply a forward contract. 
In the more interesting case of a range of eligible grades and 
locations, relation (4) can be used to say something about the joint 
probability distribution over a cash price and the futures price, as 
of the maturity date of the futures contract. Let Po be the cash 
10 
price at time t of some grade-location combination eligible for 
delivery under the futures contract (p0 = p�jt) and let h(p0) be the
probability density function over p0• Let y be the price at time t of
a futures contract maturing at time t (y = p!t>. Suppose that there
are n other grade-location combinations eligible for delivery under 
the futures contract, with prices pi' i = 1, • • •  n and that all eligible
grade-location combinations are perfect substitutes for good 0 at 
ratios ai' i = 1, • • •  ,n. Heroically, assume that the a's are all
independent and identically distributed random variables, each 
independent of p0• Let f(ai) denote the probability density function
over ai with F denoting the cumulative distribution function. The
market clearing equilibrium is given by pi= aip0, i = 1, • • •  ,n. Using
the arbitrage relation (4), we find the following joint density 
g(p0,y) where y min p . •
. i = o •. . .. n:
. l 
l 
0 
g <Po·Y> = h(p0)(1 - F(l))
n
nf(y/po) n-1 h(p0> Cl - FCy/p0> 1 Po 
for y > Po 
for y = Po 
for y < Po 
6 
(5) 
Now admittedly the assumption of independence of the ai's is
not at all realistic. In fact, as Houthakker and others have argued 
persuasively, it is the presumed high correlation among the cash 
prices that makes the futures contract a valuable tool for hedging. 
On the other hand, what the joint density (5) shows is that even when 
we assume independence among the cash prices, still the futures price 
11 
is correlated with any such cash price through the arbitrage relation 
(4). Moreover, (5) also shows that the joint density over the cash 
price for a grade-location combination deliverable under the futures 
contract and the futures price includes a spike of strictly positive 
probability relating to the case where the cash price equals the 
futures price. This spike has to be incorporated into our formulation 
of the decision problems facing hedgers in the market. 
One other feature of the joint density (5) should be noted. 
Cash and futures prices are more highly correlated at low cash prices 
than at high cash prices in the sense that for any constant value of 
y/p0, the conditional density of y given p0,(g/h)increases as Po
decreases. This result extends empirically to the case of dependence 
among cash prices since cash prices tend to be most highly correlated 
with one another and with the futures price when inventories are high, 
as Houthakker has pointed out. Obviously, inventories are high just 
after the harvest with cash and futures prices at their lowest levels. 
Since this high cash-futures price correlation at low values of the 
cash price figures large in the backwardation argument, it deserves a 
little more elaboration. Suppose there are three grades of wheat 
deliverable under the futures contract, grade X, grade Y, and grade Z. 
X is the only grade that can be used to produce output A, Y is the 
only grade usable in the production of output B, while all grades are 
more or less perfect substitutes in the production of output C (say, a 
cheap grade of flour). In Figure 2, WA, w8, and WC denote bushels of
wheat used to produce goods A, B, and C, respectively. Curves DA'
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DB, and DC are input demands for wheat in the production of each good.
Early in the crop year (just after harvest), denoted with time 
subscript "l," stocks of all grades are abundant. In particular, the 
amounts of X and Y available are large enough that more X is available 
than is demanded in producing A at the market clearing price for C and 
similarly for Y with respect to good B. Excess supplies, � and Ey,
of grades X and Y are added to the supply of Z, to be used in 
producing good C. Thus at time 1, all grades sell for the same price 
which is determined by their common marginal productivity in producing 
good C. According to arbitrage condition (4), the price of a futures 
contract maturing at time 1 is equal to the cash price at time 1 of 
-1 any of the three grades of wheat, px 
-1 -1 
Py= Pz·
Late in the crop year, time 2, stocks of all grades are low.
When there is no longer any excess supply of grades X and Y in 
producing A and B at the market clearing price for C, then prices of 
the three grades move away from each other. In the particular case 
represented by Figure 2, arbitrage condition (4) dictates the price of 
a futures contract maturing at time 2 to be p2• The extent of thez 
correlation between this futures price and the cash prices of grades X 
and Y depends upon the inventory levels of the two grades and the 
location and slope of demand curves DA and DB. With uncertainty
incorporated into the picture (say as to the locations of the demand 
curves DA•Da•Dc), then it is apparent that cash prices for X and Y 
tend to be more highly correlated with the futures price at low cash 
prices (high inventories) than at high cash prices. 
13 
We use the implications of (4) to examine separately the 
decision problems of short and long hedgers in a simplified two-period 
setting. Within this two-period setting, asymmetry of arbitrage 
reduces to the implications of (4), so that some of the aspects of 
Houthakker's arguments are lost. However the basics of that argument 
are preserved. Following the stylized facts in the hedging 
literature, we take short hedgers to be elevator operators while long 
hedgers are millers.7
SHORT AND LONG HEDGERS 
We undertake our simplified two-period analysis in the context 
of a specific commodity market, say wheat. There are two 
participants�the elevator operator and the miller. The elevator 
operator deals in a deliverable grade of wheat and is located at an 
eligible delivery point under a futures contract. The elevator 
operator buys spot wheat and stores it until he decides to sell it. 
To the extent that he hedges, the elevator operator is a short hedger 
selling futures contracts to offset his long position in the cash 
market. 
The operation of long hedging by millers has been described in 
detail by Working (1953) . Millers make bids on flour contracts with 
flour users such as bakeries, in a more or less competitive 
environment. A successful bid in effect commits the miller to a 
forward contract to deliver flour to the bakery at a fixed price. For 
large flour contracts, wheat requirements are difficult to satisfy 
through immediate purchases in the cash markets, because of thinness 
of such markets. As a consequence, the miller buys wheat futures at 
the time of a successful bid for a flour contract. As wheat is 
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purchased over time in the cash markets to meet milling requirements, 
each cash purchase is offset by a corresponding sale of futures, so 
that gradually over time the initial long hedge is terminated. It was 
in describing this behavior that Working (1953) introduced a new view 
of hedging, namely, 
the hedge in futures should not be regarded as an offset to the 
forward sale of flour, but as a temporary substitute for a 
purchase of spot wheat. Indeed, any hedging purchase or sale of 
futures is a temporary substitute for a 'cash' purchase or sale, 
regardless of the reason for choosing to hedge (p . 131) . 
The following assumptions are made in modeling the behavior of 
the elevator operator and the miller. At time 0 (today), there is 
just one futures contract being traded, maturing at time 1 (tomorrow) . 
f . h . f h f d d f . . . Po is t e price o t e utures contract to ay an p1 is its price
tomorrow. Similarly, p� and p� denote the cash prices today and
tomorrow. We take the grade-location combination to be the same for 
the miller and the elevator operator. Each firm has an equity of M 
dollars . Furthermore, the miller has the same wheat requirement as 
the elevator operator, W bushels, and both participants are risk-
averse expected-utility maximizers with identical joint p.d.f.s over 
cash and futures prices. 
Looking first at the elevator operator, we assume that all 
assets of the operator are in the form of stocks of wheat. With wh
15 
denoting hedged stocks and wu denoting unhedged stocks, wh + wu = W.
In addition, there is an out-of-pocket cost, k dollars per unit, for 
warehousing and insurance per period . 
Let � and � denote asset values for our firms at times 0 and
l, respectively. We have the following accounting identities for the 
elevator operator (short hedger, S): 
� 
AS1
M c p0W
c f plW + (po 
f p1)wh - kW.
(6) 
(7) 
In expression (7), � is the value of assets net of warehousing and
insurance costs, after futures contracts sold at time 0 are cancelled 
by purchases at time 1 .  Note that if � < 0, then the elevator
operator defaults on his futures contracts and/or his commitments for 
insurance and other services. We will ignore this possibility in what 
follows. 
The activities of the miller are more complicated. Our 
simplified analysis does some violence to the process of gradual 
release of the long hedge as described by Working. We assume that at 
time 0, the miller undertakes a flour commitment involving a wheat 
requirement, W, with forward delivery on the flour contract at time 1 .  
The bid price on the flour contract is based o n  p�, the cash price of 
wheat at time O. In addition, at the same time (time 0), the miller 
ir,st i tlite s a hedge against a portion (up to 100%) of the wheat 
commitments by buying futures contracts that mature at time 1 .  For 
modeling convenience, purchases of cash wheat are telescoped into a 
single purchase at time 1 in the cash mark.et, following which the 
wheat is immediately converted into flour. The long hedge is 
terminated at the time of the cash wheat purchase through an 
offsetting sale of futures. 
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Let a; denote the markup over milling cost by the miller. Then 
the net revenue from the milling operations is given by 
c 
<Po + a p�)W. However, since p� is uncertain at time 0, there is no
guarantee that the miller will have enough cash to purchase the W 
bushels of wheat needed to complete the flour contract. That is, the 
miller might default on his forward contract to the bakery. Hence, 
initial and final asset values for the miller (long hedger, L) nre 
given l"'Y 
l ''o = )! 
�= 
where 
B 
0 
if B 2 0 
otherwise, 
(8) 
( 9) 
B ( f f c c 8 P1 - Po>wh + <Po + a - P1Hl + M. (IO) 
Note that B is simply the sum of profits from the miller's futures 
market activity, profits from milling, and the initial value of 
assets, assuming that W bushels of wheat are throughput. If B < 0, 
then the miller defaults on his flour contract to the bakery. Through 
the rest of this paper we will assume that there is no risk of default 
17 
,by the miller on his flour contract, that is, B 2 0 for (p:.p�) pairs
occurring with positive probability weights.9
HEDGING AND BACKWARDATION 
We consider the equity constraint to be binding and look first 
at the case of a perfect hedge, that is, the case in which p: = p� is
an identity for all (p:.p�). Let h(p�) denote the density over p� in
this case. The utility function u for a short or long hedger is 
monotone increasing and strictly concave. The maximization-problems 
for the short and long hedger are, respectively, 
s s= s c c max EU = 0u(A1)h(p1)c1p1 wh,wh 
s. t. 
and 
c p0W M 
L s= L c c max EU = 0u(AJ:)h(p1)dp1wh,wu 
s.t. c p0W = M. 
Since the expressions involved are tedious, we carry through the 
remaining decision calculus for the short hedger only.IO
With W fixed, the problem of the short hedger can be restated 
as that of maximizing EU
8 with respect to wh, 0 � wh � W. In this
s s 
formulation, dEU _ � dwh - ilwh
s 11 ()EU , where ilwu
3EUS 
awh 
aEUS 
aw u 
Thus we have 
f m 1 S f C C Ou (Al)[po - k]h(pl)dpl
f m 1 S C C C Ou (Al)[pl - k]h(pl)dpl
�J:'TTS fm S f c c)d c  = u'CAJ:>CPo - pl]h(pl P1 � 0 
Integrating this expression by parts yields 
c 
f 
m 
1 S f C C C 
u CAJ:)[po - pl]h(pl)dpl0 
u' c.{> 
P1 f f m [p0 - x]h(x)dx 100 
c m pl f £f [p� -0 0 
s cx]h(x)dx}u' 'CAJ:)W dp1 • 
Additionally, if there is no back:wardation in the market 
f c (po 2 Epl C 
f Ep1)), then (13) becomes
("" ' s f c c c 
J ou <AJ:>CPo - P1lh(p1)dp1 L 
c
s sP1 c Imu'CA1) 0 [Ep1 - x]h(x)dx 0 
c 
18 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
fm rPl C S C - 0£j0 [Ep1 - x]h(x)dx}u''CA]:)Wdp1 > O. (13') 
s 
With �� > 0, clearly the optimal solution is to set wh = W. This 
leads into the following. 
Proposition 1: Assume a risk-averse elevator operator facing a 
strictly binding equity constraint, M. Suppose that a perfect 
hedge is possible and that there is no back.vartlation in the 
19 
market (p� 2 Ep:). Then the operator will hedge all stocks; only
if there is backwardation in the market will any of his stocks be 
left unhedged. 
By the same argument, we have the following for long hedgers. 
Proposition 2: Assume a risk-averse miller facing a strictly 
binding equity constraint. Suppose that a perfect hedge· is 
possible and that no contango exists, that is, p� � Ep:. The
miller will hedge all stocks; only if there is a contango in the 
market will any of his committments be left unhedged. 
These propositions can be viewed as applications of Jensen's 
Inequality. With all stocks hedged, and no backwardation (no 
contango), the elevator operator (miller) achieves an income (with 
certainty) whose utility exceeds the expected utility of income under 
any mixed (some stocks hedged, some unhedged) portfolio. With a 
strictly concave utility function, the option of hedging all stocks 
has a higher expected utility than that associated with any mixed 
portfolio. 
This leads into the following result concerning backwardation 
as an equilibrium condition in the futures market. 
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Proposition 3: Assume that perfect hedges are possible to both 
elevator operators ,and millers, that there is no default risk, 
and that wheat commitments of millers equal stocks of wheat held 
by elevator operators. Then a market equilibrium can be 
sustained without speculative activity, with p� f E(pl).
Vii th p� = E(pi), both millers and elevator operators hedge all their
commitments, and with speculators with the same pdf over prices that 
hedgers have, the futures market clears. 
Propositions 1 and 2 do not hold when a perfect hedge is not 
possible, that is, when the futures contract is not simply a forward 
contract. We formalize this as follows. 
Proposition 4 :  Assume a short (long) hedger, facing a binding 
equity constraint. Then with only imperfect hedges possible, the 
absence of back:wardation (of a contango) is not sufficient to 
guarantee that all commitments will be hedged, for arbitrary 
concave utility functions. 
Proof: We outline the proof for the case of a short hedger. The 
argument is identical for the case of a long hedger. 
When a perfect hedge is not possible, the elevator operator 
finds that even with all of his stocks hedged, he is still faced with 
a nondegenerate pdf over income. The decision problem in this case 
f c becomes (recall that p1 � p1 by (4))
max EU
8
= 
wh
c 
f 
.. 
fpl s . f c f"" s c c0 u(Al)g( )dpldpl + Ou(Al)h(pl)dpl0 
subject to p�W M.
Taking the equity constraint as fixed and binding, we have 
dEUS
dwh 
c 
.. p f f 
O 
1u' (�)(p� 
0 
pi)g(°)dpidp� 
f.. , s f f c c + Ou CAI:l<Po - P1lh(pl)dp1·
W) s dEU (wh If the optimal wh occurs at W, then dw 2 0 . h 
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In contrast to the "perfect hedge" case, in general we cannot 
prove that in the absence of back:wardation all of the operator's 
inventory will be hedged. 
In fact, it is well known (see Quirk and Saposnik (1962) and 
Hadar and Russell (1969)) that a definite ordering of preferences over 
probability distributions holding for all monotone (or monotone 
concave) measurable utility functions occurs only with stochastically 
dominated distributions. In particular, Eu(f) £ EU(g) for all 
monotone concave utility functions u iff f�.,F(t)dt � f�.,G(t)dt for all
x, where F and G are the cdf's associated with f and g respectively. 
In our context, we have 
cf .. rl f c f c P(t) = Pr{Al � t} = 0 c g(pl,pl)dpl dpl
y(pl,t) 
flHtl c c c + 0 g(pl,pl)dpl'
f 
where lHt) = 
t + kW - M - Po wh
• andw u 
c c W f t -M 'Y(P , t) = (p - k)- + p - --1 1 wh 0 wh 
Differentiating P(t) with respect to wh:
�P(t) 
= 
_ s=.k£.g('Y·P�)dp� + �g(�.�), vwh
oawh h 
where 
.kl. t - M - (pc - k)W
- 1 awh 
- 2 wh
f f ....ll. = ..1..{t + kW - M - Po - pOwh}awh WU 
s· � dst � d 1nce aw an -= aw xh h 
are ambiguous in sign, depending on t and the functional form of g, 
stochastic dominance of either the first or second degree cannot be 
established, and hence Proposition 1 does not extend to the general 
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case. Similarly, Proposition 2 is generally limited to the case of a 
perfect hedge. 
Intuitively, for the short hedger, the reason for this failure 
is as follows. The terminal value of the elevator operator's assets 
can be written as 
with 
and 
s c c f f Al
= plwu + (pl+ Po - pl)wh - kW
� c c f f wuEp1 + (Ep1 + Po - Ep1)wh - kW,
2 
a'\ 
S _ _2 2 2 2 W-a c + wha f - 2Wwha f c 
P1 P1 P1P1 
so that for fixed W, 
s
f faEAI E c + P - Ep1
_
_ 
= Pl 0 awh 
2 aa s
Al 2 -Wa
fc). 
-- = 2(wha f p l' awh pl 1 1 
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a EA 
TI.c nonback:wardation condition p� 2 Epi insures that: ·aw l 2 0,h 
but increasing the share of inventory hedged increases the variance of 
� at the same time it increases the expected value of '\• as wh
approaches W. For a risk averse operator, this tradeoff can lead to a 
diversified portfolio involving some hedged and some unhedged 
inventory. 
While Propositions 1 and 2 do not extend to the case where 
only imperfect hedges are possible, still it is possible to say 
something about back:wardation in the imperfect hedge case, given that 
most of the probability weight is concentrated in the range of low 
values of p�. In particular, when the utility function exhibits 
constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion (which implies u' is 
strictly convex), then back:wardation can be established. The 
following proposition holds. 
Proposition 5 :  Assume that millers and elevator operators are 
identical, with the wheat commitments of millers equaling the 
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stocks of wheat held by operators. The utility function common 
to millers and elevator operators exhibits constant or decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. S L Let wh, wh denote the amounts of wheat
f c hedged by short (S) and long (L) hedgers. Then for g(p1, p1)
sufficiently concentrated about low values of 
p�, w� 2 w; if p� 2 Epi, with w� > w; if 0 < w� < W. 
Proof: With w
8 
= w1- = W and with w� 
L A1 = M - n where
L S wh = wh, Al 
l! = c (pl p
�)W + (p� - pi)"'h - k\'l, 
M + n and
asswning k, the per bushel. storage cost facing the elevator operator, 
equals a, the per bushel marknp of the miller. With an interior 
maximum for w�, we have 
while 
aEUS
awh 
aEuL
awh
c 
J"'J
pl ' f f • f co o u (M + n)(po - P1)g( )dp1dP1
J"', f c c c_ + 0u (M + n)(p0 - p1)h(p1)dp1 - o
c 
J"'J
pl f f • f c
o o u' (M - n)(pl - Po)g( )dpldpl
J ... , c f c c + 0u (M - n)Cp1 - p0)h(p1)dp1 
Hence, 
aEr aEU
8
= 
aEuL is given by awh 
- awh awh
c 
J"'J
pl f f • f c 
0 0 [u'Ol - n) + u'(M + n)J<p1 - p0)g( )dp1dp1
J... c f c c + 0 [u' (M - n) + u' (M + n)] (pl - p0)h(p1)dpl.
Integrating the first integral by parts yields 
c 
aEuL
awh
J... rP1 f f • f0{[u'(M - n) + u'(M + n)]Jo (pl - p0)g( )dpl
c f 
- whfolfolcx - pf)g(")dx[u''(M - n) - u''(M +0 
J... c f c c.+ 0 [u' (M - n) + u' (M + n)] (pl - p0)h(p1)dp1 
Or, rewri tiug, 
f cn)]dp1}dp1
c 
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aEuL
awh
J"' c f c J
pl f f f c 
0[u'(M - n) + u'(M + n){(p1 - p0)h(p1) + 0 Cp1 - p0)g(")dp1}dp1
c f 
wh
J�JolJol<x p�)g(")dx[u''(M - n) - u''(M + n)]dpidp�.
Integrating again inside the first integral, by parts, and 
ccn.bi:ni:nr; terms we obtain 
aEu1-
= (Ep: - p�) awh 
lim [u'(l\l - n) + u'(M + n)]
P
c 
�"' 
1 
c 
f"'J
pl f + wuJ O 0 [u'' (fr! - n) - u'' (M + n)] { [(x - p0)h(x)dx
c 
Ct
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f 
J
pl f c f c + 0 (y - pO)g(y, pl)dydpl}dpl. (14) 
Assume that Epi i pg, i.e. no back:wardation. Then the first term on
the RBS of (14) is non-positive, since u' > O. In the second term,
the expression inside the curved brackets is negative at low values of 
f c p1 and p1. (Recall that pi = p� is associated with the p. d. f.
c h(pl)).
Moreover u'' < 0 while constant or decreasing absolute risk
aversion implies u''' > 0, which in turn implies that at low values of
p�, u''(M - n) > u''(M + n). Bence, for g sufficiently concentrated 
around low values of (pi, p�), the second integral is strictly negative
for w > 0.u 
L 
Thus we have that p� 2 Epi implies that � i 0, evaluated at
h 
w� = w�. It follows that pg 2 Epi implies w� 2
S S L . 12 0 <wh < W, then wh > wh. (See Figure 3). 
w1 · further if h' , 
Corollary. Under the conditions of Proposition 5 ,  with speculators 
having the same pdf, g(pi,p�) as hedgers, with 0 < w� < W, and with
the demands of speculators for futures contracts of less than infinite 
elasticity, then the equilibrium price in the futures market exhibits 
backwardation, that is pg < Epi, with speculators sufficiently long in
futures to absorb the excess of short over long hedging. 
The intuitive reason for backwardation under the conditions of 
Proposition 5 is this. With cash and futures prices more highly 
correlated at low than at high cash prices, the futures contract 
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offers a more effective hedging protection to an individual who wants 
to avoid the risk of low cash prices than it does to one worried about 
high cash prices. This means that short hedgers have stronger 
incentives to hedge than long hedgers do, given the same pdf's, 
utility functions, and wheat commitments, and assuming pg f Epl.
Back:wardation emerges as a result of these market forces. This also 
helps explain the seasonality of back:wardation, since the 
concentration of the density g(") at low values of p� is more
pronounced early in the crop year than later as inventories are 
depleted. 
CONCLUSION 
Consider a situation in which elevator operators as a group 
have W bushels of wheat to hedge, and millers have flour commitments 
involving W bushels as well. Suppose that the futures price pg 
. f" f sat1s 1es Po Epi. In the general case of diverse probability
beliefs and attitudes toward risk on the part of millers and elevator 
operators, we have no definite conclusions to report. Depending on 
their probability beliefs and their utility functions, there might be 
an excess of long hedging or of short hedging, or the two might be 
balanced. However, when there is no default risk and a perfect hedge 
is possible, by Proposition 1, short hedgers prefer to hedge all of 
their inventories when pg 2 Epi and by Proposition 2 long hedgers
prefer to hedge all of their inventories when pg i Epi. With 
ideDtical probability beliefs, the knife-edge case of pg = Epi is
28 
consistent with market clearing with all commitments hedged on both 
sides of the market. 
In the perfect hedge case, the explanation for "normal 
backwardation" must rest on arguments other than asymmetry in 
arbitrage, for example, the technical uncertainties cited by Kaldor, 
the substitution possibilities argument of Hicks, or differences in 
probability beliefs on the part of short and long hedgers and 
speculators. 
But once we look to the case where hedges are not perfect, 
then the Houthakk.er argument that cash and futures prices tend to be 
more highly correlated at low than at high cash prices, comes to the 
fore. Assuming no default risk, Proposition 5 asserts that with 
identical individuals on the short and long hedging sides of the 
market, with the same commitments available to hedge, then when 
p� = Epi, and with the density g(") sufficiently concentrated at low
values of p�, the volume of short hedging will exceed the volume of 
long hedging, given constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion.
13
Market equilibrium will exhibit backwardation, and speculators will on 
average earn prof its by going long in the futures market. 
This paper has explored the underpinnings of the argument that 
asymmetric arbitrage provides an explanation for the existence of 
backwardation in futures markets. A high correlation between cash and 
futures prices at low cash prices is at the heart of this argument. 
Clearly the arguments advanced by Hicks, Kaldor, Dow, Working and 
others also have relevance in explaining the presence of back:wardation 
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and/or the size of the premium earned by long speculators. A:n 
important� with respect to the current paper is that it ignores 
the problem of default risk, which is a potentially important omission 
since it is precisely at low cash prices that default is most probable 
for short hedgers. Beyond clearing up default problems, it would be 
of interest to see what empirical tests might distinguish among these 
various backwardation hypotheses. 
3 0 
FOO'INOTES 
1. The "abnormal" situation in which back:wardation might not occur 
is one in which there are "redundant liquid stocks" of a good; 
such redundant stocks can lead to a "contango" on the market 
(futures price greater than the spot price). 
2. One of the most interesting exchanges concerning backwardation is 
that between Telser (1958 , 1960) and Cootner (1960). Telser's 
model of the commodity markets is one in which competitive 
pressures are assumed to reduce speculative profits to zero, so 
that the market clearing futures price equals the expected future 
spot price. Cootner points out that speculative prof its are 
deferred in time, so that the purchaser of a futures contract has 
an opportunity cost equal to the market rate of return (adjusted 
for risk) on the speculator's investment in margin, a cost 
ignored in Telser's formulation. Cootner also objects to 
Telser's empirical findings that speculators don't make money on 
the average, by pointing out that Telser's assumption that the 
futures price should rise over the entire inter-harvest period 
ignores the seasonal pattern of short and long hedging. In fact, 
based on an analysis of Telser's data on wheat, Cootner notes 
that: 
If we asstllI!e that speculators go short before the harvest, 
continue that short position until net hedging by large 
traders reaches a peak, and then go long, they consistently 
make a profit (p. 402) . 
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In his reply, Telser (1960) reexamines the pattern of 
hedging, showing that short hedging peaks on average just after 
the harvest and reaches a trough just before the harvest, with 
net (short minus long) hedging being positive all year long, this 
pattern holding for both wheat and cotton. Moreover, Telser 
shifts to the normal backwardation camp: 
• • •  it is fair to conclude that, on the basis of powerful 
statistical tests, the weight of the evidence lends some
support to Keynes and Hicks (p. 415). 
3. We have identified the literature leading to Houthakker'� �1959, 
1968) backwardation hypothesis. To be sure, other views exist. 
Holbrook Working (1948) introduces the notion of storage supply 
as a function of the basis; the amount of storage offered 
increases with market carrying charges as measured by the basis. 
See also Samuelson (1957). According to Working and his supply 
curve for storage, when back:warda ti on in the Keynes-Hicks sense 
(spot price exceeds futures price) exists, it reflects an 
"inverse carrying charge" due to the convenience yield of 
inventories held by processors of a commodity. Later, Working 
(1962) argues that "A significant tendency for futures prices to 
rise during the life of each future is not uniformly present in 
futures markets, and when it exists, it is to be attributed 
chiefly to lack of balance in the market" (p. 432). Some time 
before, Blau (1945) felt that the case for back:wardation had not 
been proven. In particular, Blau notes that speculative demands 
and supplies can overwhelm market forces exerted by hedgers, a 
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point made earlier by Kaldor. In a related view, Working (1961) 
comments as follows: wThe concept that risk-bearing commands a 
reward applied at several related points in the theory of futures 
markets, has served poorly to account for observed phenomena of 
the markets. One of its applications led J. M. Keynes to advance 
the concept of 'normal backwardation,' but the observed 
tendencies toward backwardation vary widely according to 
circumstances, as shown by R. W. Gray, in a manner not reasonably 
explainable on the basis of differences in risk premium" (p. 
163). Houthakker's 1959 studies indicate that speculators earn a 
risk premium from hedgers: w . ,the risk premium accruing to 
long futures speculators with 'general skill' before deducting 
commissions and other expenses, is of the order of 8% per year on 
the value of their holdings; Keynes, himself, on the basis of 
unspecified data, had put it at 10%w (p. 154). With a 10 percent 
margin requirement (plus 10 percent more to cover margin calls), 
an 8 percent annual rate of increase in the futures price amounts 
to a 40 percent return on a speculator's investment, a point duly 
noted by Houthakker. 
Other recent work in the rational expectations framework 
has focused attention on the role of information in futures 
markets, with differential information as between insider­
speculators and uninformed hedgers being a possible explanation 
for backwardation. However, the rationale for such differential 
information situations is not easily �&taLli>hec, and certain 
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fundamental attributes of futures markets (as contrasted, say, 
with forward markets) are ignored in this recent literature. For 
example, Danthine (1978) outlines a rational expectations model 
of a commodity market in which informed speculators participate. 
In the Danthine model, the only hedgers are short hedgers 
(producers of the good) and the futures contract is identical to 
a forward contract. Given informed speculators and uninformed 
hedgers, it turns out that " • • •  the futures price is not an 
unbiased estimator of the future spot price" (p. 91). In fact, 
the futures price is a downward biased estimator of the future 
spot price, i. e. , there is backwardation in the Danthine model, 
which is a kind of intellectual grandchild of the Kaldor (1939) 
model. In two other related studies, Baese! and Grant (1982) 
derive back:wardation in the futures market in a "perfect hedge" 
setting when producers, rather than processors, hedge through the 
futures market while Stevenson and Bear (1970) perform a 
statistical analysis of the corn and soybean markets, rejecting 
the random walk hypothesis, and providing some evidence for 
backwarda ti on. 
4. Forward contracts can be quite detailed. For example, the 
standard forward contract employed by a potato processor in 
dealing with potato farmers lays down rules concerning such items 
as the kinds of pesticides to be used, fumigation, the 
temperature at which the potatos are to be stored, and like 
matters. Most of the contract deals with rewards and penalties 
for quality differentials, these taking up almost 5 of the 10
single spaced typed pages of the contract. We wish to thank 
Lowell Bassett for making this contract available to us. 
5 .  To simplify notation in what follows, we ignore grade premiums
and penalties written into futures contracts. 
6. To verify that g(p0,y) is a density, note that g(p0,y) L 0 for 
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"" Po "" 
all Cp0,y). Further f f g(p0,y)dp0dy = f h(p0)Cl - F(l))ndp0 +
I 
0 0 0 
f.., f PO 
f(y Po) n-1 
h(pO) { n [l - FCy/p0)] dy}dp0• The term inside
0 0 Po 
the curved brackets is 1 - (1 - F(l))n, hence
"" r1'o f J g(po,y)dpody = 1. 
0 0 
7. In a recent USDA survey (see Heifner, et al [1977]), hedging was 
done almost exclusively by these agents. Farmers rarely trade in
the futures markets, but instead shift price risks by forward
selling. Presumably this reflects the technical risks (e.g.,
weather) facing farmers, as in Kaldor's (1939) comments on
hedging.
8. Both (7) and (9) ignore the opportunity costs associated with
margin requirements on futures contracts. See Cootner (1960).
9. Hedging can have the effect of limiting the risks facing market
participants. One example of such risks is the possibility of
default on debt contracts. In this paper, the model is
structured purely upon equity financing and any such loan
contract default is assumed away implicitly. In a forthcoming 
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paper, the analysis is extended to the context of debt financing 
and the effect of additional risk of loan contract default upon 
short hedgers, long hedgers, and debt suppliers. Our analysis 
thus far has revealed that the presence of loan default risk 
lessens the incentives for short and long hedging because 
unfavorable price outcomes for hedgers lead to losses by lenders, 
while favorable price outcomes increase payoffs to borrowers; 
hedgers are encouraged to be more "risk taking• in the presence 
of default risk. This result leads ns to shift our attention to 
the incentives facing lenders in the forthcoming paper. 
10. As an aid to the interested, note that for the long hedger:
11. 
.mt -
awh -
amf 
aw u
c f (b , L c c 
<Po - Po> Jou <A1>h<p1)dp1
(b , L c c c c 
Jou <A1> (po - P1)h(p1)dp1 • 
Recall that in this case of a perfect hedge, pi = p� so that
s c f 
AJ: = plwu + pOwh - kW.
12. As is clear from the proof of Proposition 5 , u''' > 0 is a
necessary condition to establish back:wardation. In particular,
if u is quadratic so that expected utility depends on the first
and second moments of the pdf over�· then with p� f Epl'
S L . ·1 "f" dwh = wh, as 1s eas1 y ver1 1e • On the other hand, concave 
quadratic utility functions violate monotonicity. 
36  
13 . The only exception to  this is the corner case in which short and
long hedgers alike wish to hedge their entire stocks when 
p� = Epi. As contrasted with the situation in the perfect hedge
case, this can arise only under restrictive assumptions 
concerning the utility function u and the joint pdf g("), as 
follows from Proposition 4 .  
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